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ABSTRACT Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a new kind of digital technology that increases its attention
across academia, government, and industry sectors and covers a wide range of applications like agriculture,
energy, medical, transportation, etc. The traditional power systems with physical equipment as a core
element are more integrated with information and communication technology, which evolves into the
Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS). The CPPS consists of a physical system tightly integrated with cyber
systems (control, computing, and communication functions) and allows the two-way flows of electricity
and information for enabling smart grid technologies. Even though the digital technologies monitoring and
controlling the electric power grid more efficiently and reliably, the power grid is vulnerable to cybersecurity
risk and involves the complex interdependency between cyber and physical systems. Analyzing and resolving
the problems in CPPS needs the modelling methods and systematic investigation of a complex interaction
between cyber and physical systems. The conventional way of modelling, simulation, and analysis involves
the separation of physical domain and cyber domain, which is not suitable for the modern CPPS. Therefore,
an integrated framework needed to analyze the practical scenario of the unification of physical and cyber
systems. A comprehensive review of different modelling, simulation, and analysis methods and different
types of cyber-attacks, cybersecurity measures for modern CPPS is explored in this paper. A review of
different types of cyber-attack detection and mitigation control schemes for the practical power system
is presented in this paper. The status of the research in CPPS around the world and a new path for
recommendations and research directions for the researchers working in the CPPS are finally presented.
INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical power system (CPPS), CPPS modelling, CPPS simulation, cyber-physical
social system (CPSS), cyber attack, cyber security, smart grid.
ACRONYMS
ADC Analog to Digital Converter
AGC Automatic Generation Control
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
CPN Coloured Petri Net
CPPS Cyber-Physical Power System
CPS Cyber-Physical System
CPSS Cyber-Physical Social System
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EV Electric Vehicle
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HVDC High-Voltage Direct Current
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
MDP Markov Decision Process
NDFSM Non-Deterministic FSM
NIST National Institute of Science and
Technology
PDF Probability Distribution Function
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCD State Chart Diagram
SMP Semi Markov Process
SPN Stochastic Petri Net
VPP Virtual Power Plant
WAC Wide-Area Control
WADC Wide-Area Damping Controller
WAMS Wide-Area Measurement System




In the past years, the power and control system engineers
are working very hard to develop the tools and techniques
for improving the performance of monitoring and control
of the physical power system. At the same time, computer
science and electronics engineers are working on the cyber
system to enhance the performance of the computing and
communication systems. It leads to the development of com-
puting ubiquitous. In our day to day life, every gadget
and electronic devices are integrated with low-cost com-
puting and communication networks. There is no doubt it
will going to create a significant impact on the energy sys-
tem [1]. The integration of physical and cyber system evolves
into a new digital technology called Cyber-Physical System
(CPS). Nowadays, CPS increases its attention in all sectors
like agriculture, energy, medical, oil & gas industries, and
transportation, etc. The CPS is defined as a heterogeneous
multi-dimensional systemwith integrated cyber part (control,
computing, communication) to attain the characteristics of
stability, robustness, efficiency, and reliability in physical
systems applications. In the CPS, the cyber system acquires
the data from the physical system by the sensor and fed back
the control signal to the physical system to attain the common
goals, as shown in Fig. 1. To maintain the efficient and secure
operation of the power systems, it is necessary to integrate the
physical power system with a cyber system [2]. The integra-
tion of the physical power system with a cyber system [3], [4]
evolves into a strongly coupled cyber-physical power sys-
tem (CPPS). The CPPS covers all the domains of the electric
power systems like Generation, Transmission, Distribution,
and Utilization, as shown in Fig. 2. A Cyber Physical Power
System (CPPS) is a system that combines and coordinates
the internet and physical power system elements. These
systems are distributed networks executing in unpredictable
FIGURE 1. Structure of the cyber-physical system.
environments and built from control systems and embedded
systems to monitor and regulate the physical power system in
real time. CPPSs are designed as a structure of interacting ele-
ments with physical input and output. This is not about adding
computing and communication techniques to conservative
inventions where both sides maintain distinct individualities.
This is about the integration of computing and networking
with physical power systems to generate novel innovations
in science, technical skills, and creations. Cyber is an inte-
gration of communication, computation, and control systems.
Physical means natural and human-made power systems that
are governed and managed by the physics regulations and
functioning in constant time. In CPPSs, the cyber and phys-
ical systems are those firmly incorporated at all stages and
dimensions. CPPS uses embedded computers and networks to
compute, communicate, and organize physical power system
actions. Simultaneously, a CPPS receives feedback on how
physical power system events impact computations and vice
versa as shown in Fig. 1. Just as the Internet facilitates a
way for the humans to interact with each other, CPPSs will
transform in a way, how we interact with the physical power
system world around us. To enable standard communication
link between heterogeneous systems, CPPS-Interconnection
Protocol is used. This protocol is mainly designed for spe-
cial CPSs such as CPPSs, which require overall instruc-
tion and performance guarantee for cyber physical interac-
tion. The main objective of this protocol is to offer CPPSs
heterogeneity at three different levels: function interoper-
ability, policy regulation, and performance assurance. Later,
the transport protocol services used in the design of CPS-
Interconnection Protocol. As an intellectual challenge, CPPS
is about the intersection, not the union of the physical
power system and the cyber. It is not adequate to indi-
vidually understand the physical power system components
and the computational components. We must instead under-
stand their interaction as shown in Fig. 2. The design of
such systems, therefore, requires understanding the joint
dynamics of computers, software, networks, and physical
power systems.
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FIGURE 2. Structure of the cyber-physical power system (CPPS).
There are three levels of interactions in the CPPS. The first
level of interaction occurs between the generator, transformer,
transmission line, and dynamic load, etc. with the power
system controller. The power system controller senses the
information from the power system core components and
calculates the control signal, then fed back to the power
system core components for the optimized operations of the
power grid.
The effect of delay in transmitting the generator status
information to the power system control center on power
system stability is investigated in [5], [6]. The evaluation
of the impact of the delay on the power system stability by
eigenvalue sensitivity and eigenvalue tracing method is pre-
sented in [7]. The calculation of the time-delay margin to
determine the maximum delay time that the system can
sustain without losing its stability is presented in [5], [8].
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The compensation of time delay using fuzzy logic based
wide-area damping controller method [9], linear matrix
inequalities & Lyapunov stability method [10], and Lyapunov
based time-varying multiple delayed systems methods are
presented in [11]. The modelling of different types of time
delays in a wide-area closed-loop control system is presented
in [12]. The time-delayed power system stability analysis
by integral quadratic constraints method [13], multiple time-
delayed signals methods [14], and realistic delay modelling
method [15] are investigated.
The second level of interaction occurs between the power
system control and the communication infrastructure. The
communication infrastructure acts as a backbone that coor-
dinates all the functions of the subsystems (sensor, actu-
ators, interfaces, control, computing, and communication
units) in CPPS. The communication effects like data loss,
bad data, time-delay, etc., severely impacts the performance
of the CPPS. The authors in [16], [17] demonstrated the
impact of time-varying communication delay on the sta-
bility of the practical large-scale CPPS in the transmission
domain. The impact of asynchronous communication delays
between the distributed phasor data concentrators for oscil-
lation monitoring application of a wide-area power system
is investigated in [18]. The impact of coordinated physical
and cyber uncertainties (communication delay and packet
dropout) on closed-loop control of a wide-area power system
application is presented in [19]. The modelling of differ-
ent types of delayed CPS for stability analysis and control
using Delayed Differential Equation (DDE) method [20],
Solution Operator Discretization with Linear Multistep and
Implicit Runge-Kutta (SOD-LMS/IRK) method [21], Partial
and Explicit Infinitesimal Generator Discretization (PEIGD)
method [22], Pseudo-Spectral Discretization of Solution
Operator method [23], Time integration-based Discretization
of Infinitesimal Generator (IGD) method [24], and the com-
parison of different types of stability analysis method for the
delayed cyber-physical system is investigated in [25].
The third level of interaction occurs between the
communication infrastructure and the cyber system. The
components of cyber systems are master and slave system,
master server, communication server, bidirectional communi-
cation structure, high-performance computing stations, intel-
ligent control application software, cyber-attack security and
defence mechanisms, etc. The primary function of the cyber
system is to perform the advanced operations in the power
grid like load forecasting, state estimation, var optimization,
voltage control, oscillation monitoring, wide-area monitoring
& control, operations planning, model validation, stability
analysis, etc. As the size of the power grid networks is
growing day by day to meet the load demand, the size of the
cyber system also growing in the same manner, and no longer
will it be a conventional electric power system. Due to this,
CPPS is becoming a complex system with strong interactions
between physical and cyber systems with the deployment of
a huge number of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in the
electric power grid. The secure operation of the power grid
does not only depend on power flow in the physical system
but also depends on information flow in the cyber system, i.e.,
Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Even
though the cyber system ensures efficient, safe, and secure
operation for the power grid, the power blackouts occurred
in the power grid history is mainly due to the failure of the
cyber system.
The main drawback of CPPS is the cyber-attack and
cybersecurity problem. The CPPS is a big heterogeneous
networked transmission and distribution system with a huge
load that has a chance of entering of a cyber-attack. The
components of the cyber systems are severely vulnerable
to external cyber threats and cyber-attacks through cyber
connections due to the flaw in cybersecurity features. Since
the cyber-attack does not damage the physical power system
directly, but once coordinated with a physical attack, it creates
the same impact as physical damage and leads to system
instability. Therefore, it is necessary to review the various
cyber-attacks and cybersecurity measures in CPPS.
Researchers around the world have conducted various
research on CPPS from different perspectives [26]–[28]. The
main characteristic of CPPS are the strong interdependency
between the cyber and physical systems. The authors have
investigated the impacts of various cyber contingency on a
physical system using the model-based method [29]–[31].
With the development of synchrophasor technology for
wide-area monitoring and control of CPPS, the cyberattacks
are increasing nowadays [32]–[34]. The authors did extensive
research on the analysis of different types of cyber-attacks
like denial-of-service attack, false data injection attack, and
man-in-the-middle attack in CPPS and shown the jeopardize
of stability [35]–[37]. To protect the complex power grid con-
trol networks of CPPS, it is necessary to perform the risk and
vulnerability assessment under cyber-attacks [38]–[40]. The
various methods of risk [41]–[44] and vulnerability assess-
ment [45]–[48] from the component level to system-wide
impacts, with cyber model assessment and physical model
assessment, are performed. Substantial work on cyber-attack
detection and mitigation for CPPS by monitoring the net-
work traffic of the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA)/Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) system in the
power system control centre was performed in [49]–[52].
It forms the overall cybersecurity feature for the CPPS,
which is entirely different from the traditional information
security with advanced data analytics and machine learn-
ing algorithms. It can able to distinguish the normal and
attack activities in the cyber systems. The research inter-
est of designing Wide-Area Damping Controller (WADC)
for damping inter-area oscillations in the large-scale CPPS
considering the cyber-attack on the physical power sys-
tem is increased nowadays [53]–[55]. The cyber-physical
attack resilient Wide-Area Control (WAC) technique aims
to enhance the stability of CPPS at an earlier stage before
the system reaches the blackout condition [56], [57]. It is
designed to be adaptive to the continuous expansion of the
modern CPPS considering the cyber contingencies on the
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physical power system with its high dimensionality and com-
plex interconnection structure.
Nowadays, more researchers working in the field of CPPS,
especially to analyze the stability of CPPS in the control sys-
tem point of view. It is necessary to analyze the electric power
grid as a whole cyber-physical social system, i.e., integrated
physical and cyber (control, communication, and computing)
part with cybersecurity features. The traditional method of
modelling, simulation, and analysis of electric power system
operation is entirely based on the physical part of the power
grid. This no longer supports the future CPPS research and
development. Also, it is difficult to assess the impact of cyber
contingency on physical power systems for the safe operation
of CPPS. The integration and the unification of cyber and
physical systems are needed to optimize the configuration
of the cyber side for ensuring the safe and secure operation
of the electric power grid. In recent years it is difficult to see
the literature survey on different types of modelling, simula-
tion, and analysis methodswith cybersecurity applications for
CPPS. Therefore, it is necessary to review the different types
of modelling, simulation, and analysis methods available for
reflecting the characteristics of cyber and physical systems in
CPPS. In this review paper, different types of cyber and phys-
ical system integrated modelling methods, and simulation
software packages are presented. The different types of cyber-
attacks and cybersecurity measures for CPPS also reviewed.
The status of CPPS in the developed countries and research
directions & recommendations in CPPS are finally presented.
Fig. 3 shows the structure of this survey.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The
different types of modelling methods that cover the phys-
ical and cyber part of CPPS are presented in Section II.
Section III presents the different types of software used for the
modelling and simulation of CPPS. Section IV discusses the
different types of cyber-attacks and cybersecurity measures
for CPPS. The status of the CPPS in the developed coun-
tries is presented in Section V. Section VI gives the outlook
of future CPPS. Section VII discusses the current issues
and research directions. Finally, the conclusion is given in
Section VIII.
II. MODELLING OF CPPS
The main characteristics of CPPS modelling are the tight
interaction between the physical and cyber systems at differ-
ent time, space, and scales. The physical system is dynamic
that consists of a generator, transformer, transmission line,
load, etc. are physically connected with energy flow. In con-
trast, the cyber system is a static system that consists of cyber
components connected through a communication network
with information flow. The complex interaction between the
physical and cyber system in CPPS act as a critical point
of failure with both the systems are in different topolo-
gies. In the large-scale CPPS, the failure of one system
leads to catastrophic cascading failure in the overall sys-
tem. The performance of the one system heavily depends
upon another system, i.e., interdependent nature of cyber and
FIGURE 3. Structure of the survey in CPPS.
physical systems. The comparison between the characteris-
tics of the cyber system and the physical system is shown
in Table 1.
Both physical and cyber system has its uncertainties
independently. The integration of renewable energy into
the physical system, which is stochastic in nature, affects
the steady-state operating condition of the power flow in the
system. In cyber systems, the cyber-attacks on control, com-
puting, and communication functions alter the information
flow. These uncertainties are unpredictable, which increases
the risk of safe and secure operation of the power system.
The interaction characteristics of the physical and cyber sys-
tems complicate the modelling of CPPS. Therefore, it is
necessary to develop the modelling framework for a critical
understanding of complexity and interdependency in CPPS
and analyze in terms of both qualitative and quantitative
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of physical and cyber system in CPPS.
approaches between physical and cyber systems. This will
help to prevent the spreading of catastrophic cascading failure
events in a networked CPPS.
The modelling of CPPS is broadly classified into three
categories.
(A) CPPS Interconnection Modelling (the act of physical
and cyber system in a distinct manner)
(B) CPPS Interaction Modelling (effect of physical and
cyber systems has on each other)
(C) CPPS Interdependent Modelling (degree of physical
and cyber systems depends on each other)
A. CPPS INTERCONNECTION MODELLING (THE ACT OF
PHYSICAL AND CYBER SYSTEM IN A DISTINCT MANNER)
In this modelling, the CPPS is modelled by the intercon-
nection of a physical system, cyber system, and the system
need to interconnect them. The physical system consists of
physical components of the power system needs to be moni-
tored and controlled. The cyber system consists of a compu-
tational algorithm that involves a control or communication
algorithm. The systems need to interconnect the physical
and cyber systems are Analog to Digital Converter (ADC),
Digital to Analog Converter (DAC), and Digital Networks.
The hybrid dynamical system theory is used to model the
CPPS, which consists of differential equations to represent
the continuous-time behaviour of the physical system and
difference equations to represent the discrete behaviour of
cyber systems, converters, and digital networks [58]. It cap-
tures the mixed behaviour of continuous, discrete systems &
their interconnections in CPPS.
1) PHYSICAL COMPONENTS MODELLING
The physical system is a continuous-time system modelled
by a differential equation with a time parameter t that
parameterizes the variables of the system, i.e., the state of the
system [58]–[60]. The mathematical equation of the physical
system is given in equation (1) and (2). Let z represents the
state of the physical system with RnP as the Euclidean space
for state space, u ∈ RmP represents the input signal for the
physical system, y ∈ RrP represents the output of the physical
system defined by the output function h.
y = h (z, u) , ż ∈ FP (z, u) (1)
(z, u) ∈ CP ⊂ RnP × RmP (2)
In specific applications, it is necessary to limit the values of
state and input to the physical system. In that case, the values
are constrained to the set CP.
2) CYBER COMPONENTS MODELLING
The function of cyber components is to executing the algo-
rithms, perform the computations, and transmitting the data
over the digital networks. The state variables of the cyber
components are discrete values that are updated at the discrete
events taken from the discrete sets rather than from a contin-
uum [58], [61], [62]. The mathematical equation of the cyber
system is given in equation (3) and (4). Let η ∈ ϒ represents
the state of the cyber system with RnC as the Euclidean space
for the state space, ν ∈ V ⊂ RmC represents the input signal
for the cyber system, ζ ∈ RrC represents the output of the
cyber system defined by the output function K , which is the
function of the input and the state (ν, η).
η+ ∈ GC (η, ν) , ζ = K (η, ν) (3)
(η, ν) ∈ DC ⊂ ϒ × ν (4)
In specific applications, it is necessary to limit the values of
state and input to the cyber system. In that case, the values are
constrained to the setDC . The mathematical modelling of the
cyber components in the cyber system is as follows.
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a: PURE FINITE STATE MACHINES
The Finite State Machine (FSM) is a computational model
that expresses the relationship between input and state of
the system. It is used to represent the control execution
flow (or) simulation of a sequential logic in many applica-
tions. At every value of the input, the state and output of
the FSM are updated. The states, inputs, and outputs of the
FSM taking the values from the discrete sets and updated at
discrete transitions when triggered by its inputs. Let ν denotes
the inputs take the value from the set 6, q denotes the states
take the value from the set Q, r denotes the outputs takes the
value from the set 1, and q0 denotes the initial value of the
state of FSM. The output function is given by K : Q → 1
and the transition function is given by δ : Q×6→ Q.
When the input ν ∈ 6 is applied to the FSM, a transition
occurs from the initial state q0 ∈ Q of the FSM to a new
state by q1 = δ(q0, v). The FSM output is updated to k (q1)
after the transition and this transition mechanism in FSM
is represented mathematically by the difference equation in
equation (5).
q+ = δ (q, ν) ζ = K (q) (q, ν) ∈ Q×6 (5)
This model is similar to the cyber components model given
in equation (3) and (4) with ϒ = Q,GC = δ, η = q,
ν = 6,DC = ϒ × ν.
b: FSM WITH CONDITIONAL STRUCTURES AS GUARDS
In certain applications, the transition occurs in FSM based
on the conditional structure, for instance, the transition is
triggered in the FSM when the input ν < 0. The conditional
structure is a Boolean expression; if its evaluation gives true
condition, the transition is enabled, and if it was false it
would be aborted. The mathematical modelling of FSM with
transition according to the conditional structure is defined by,
let the function `Q×6 ×1→ R be the testing function for
the transition condition for each state q ∈ Q. Assume that
the conditional structure ` (q, ν, ζ ) designed to satisfy for the
value of less than or equal to zero as given in equation (6)
otherwise not satisfied. The transition triggered in FSM based
on the conditional structure (`) model is given by
q+ = δ (q, ν) , ζ =K (q) , ` (q, ν, ζ )≤0, (q, ν) ∈ Q×6
(6)
This model is similar to the cyber components model in
equation (3) and (4) with ϒ = Q,GC = δ, η = q, ν =
6,DC = {(q, ν) ∈ Q× ν : l (q, ν,K (q)) ≤ 0}.
c: MODELLING OF COMPUTER COMPUTATIONS AND
DISCRETE-TIME ALGORITHMS
There are two types of computations, one-shot computation,
and iterative computation. The computation model is repre-
sented in a discrete-time system with ν as the input of the
model, and the output of the computation model is ζ . The
mathematical model of the one-shot computation is given by
ζ = K̃ (ν) (7)
where the function K̃ represents the modelling of the com-
putation being performed. This model is similar to the cyber
components model in equation (3) and (4), with η = ∅, ϒ =
∅, ν = 6,DC = ν,GC = ∅,K = K̃ . The iterative
computation technique requires a number of steps to perform
the computation. It is defined as a discrete-time system with
additional variables as m ∈ Rnc−1 and the counter as k ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . k∗} , k∗ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} =: N that performs k∗
iterations to produce the final outcome of the computations.
Denoting η= [mTK ]T as the state of the computation model,
ν as the input signal and K̃ as the function performing the
iterative computation, the computational model is given by
η+ =
[
K̃ (m, k, v)
k + 1
]
, ζ = m, m ∈ RnC−1,
k ∈
{
0, 1, 2, . . . , k∗ − 1
}
, ν ∈ V (8)
The model represented in the eqn (8) is similar to the




, ϒ = RnC−1 × {0, 1, 2, . . . ,K∗} , ν = 6,GC =[
K̃ (m, k, v)
k + 1
]
and K (η) = m∀η ∈ ϒ , DC = RnC−1 ×
{0, 1, 2, . . . ,K∗ − 1}. The difference equations are used
to model the discrete-time algorithms. The discrete-time
feedback controller can be designed by discretizing the
continuous-time controller designed by the continuous-time
system design tools or designing the discrete-time feedback
controller directly. The discrete-time algorithm can be written
as
η+ = GC (η, ν) ζ = K (η) (9)
where GC is obtained by discretizing the continuous-time
control algorithm.
3) MODELLING OF THE INTERFACE SYSTEM BETWEEN
CYBER AND PHYSICAL COMPONENTS
The model represents the behaviour of the cyber and phys-
ical system has different dynamics: the cyber system has
discrete dynamics while the physical system has a contin-
uous dynamic. The interfaces are used to interconnect the
cyber and physical systems and convert the signals appro-
priately [58], [63], [64]. The mathematical model of the
interfaces used to interconnect the cyber and physical system,
and finally, the cyber system, physical system, and interfaces
are interconnected to define the complete model of CPS.
a: ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER (ADC)
ADC is a sampling device or sensor which provides the
information measured from the physical system to the cyber
system. The main function of ADC is to sample the output (y)
of the physical system at a sampling rate of T ∗s then the sam-
ples are sent to the embedded computer in the cyber system.
The model of ADC has two states, sample state and timer
state. If the timer attains the sampling time of T ∗s the timer is
reset to zero, and the sampler state is updated with the recent
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output from the physical system. The mathematical model of
the sampling device is given in equation (10) and (11)
τ̇s = 1, ṁs = 0 when τs ∈ [0,T ∗s ] (10)
τ+s = 0, m
+
s = vs when τs ≥ T
∗
s (11)
where τs ∈ R≥0 denotes the timer state,ms ∈ RrP denotes the
sample state, and vs ∈ RrP denotes the input of the sampling
device. In the practical ADC, a time delay exists between the
triggering of ADC to sample its input and update its output
called ADC acquisition time. This time delay reduces the
number of samples per second to be sampled by the ADC.
In addition to this, the digital output value of ADC is stored
in a sample state finite length digital words, which causes the
quantization effect. This model omits the quantization effects
and ADC acquisition time, but these can be included in the
model if needed.
b: DIGITAL TO ANALOG CONVERTER (DAC)
The DAC converts the digital signal into an analog signal for
their use in the physical system. The Zero-Order Hold (ZOH)
model is a commonly usedmodel for the DAC, which updates
its output at discrete instants of time periodically and held
constant in between the updates until the new information
is available at the next sampling time. The mathematical
modelling of the DAC as ZOH is given in the equation (12)
and (13), which is similar to the equation (10) and (11).
τ̇h = 1, ṁh = 0 when τh ∈ [0,T ∗h ] (12)
τ+h = 0, m
+
h = vh when τh ≥ T
∗
h (13)
Let τh ∈ R≥0 be the timer state,mh ∈ RrC be the sample state,
and vh ∈ RrC be the inputs of the DAC. The operation of DAC
is as follows: if τh ≥ T ∗h , the state of the timer is reset to zero,
and the sample state is updated with the new input vh(output
of the embedded computer in the cyber system).
c: DIGITAL NETWORKS
The transfer of information between the cyber and physi-
cal systems (or) between the subsystems of a cyber system
occurs over a digital network. It bridges all the subsystems
and components and transmits the sampled information at
discrete-time instants. If the triggering condition is satis-
fied, the information provided at its input is transmitted
over the digital network and stores that information until
the new information arrives. Let assume the information was





∈ N ∪ {∞}, satisfying T ∗minN ≤
ti+1 − ti ≤ T ∗maxN ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . .i
∗
− 1}, where T ∗minN and




N ∈ [0,∞] and
T ∗minN ≤ T
∗max
N , i
∗ denotes the number of transmission events,
T ∗minN denotes the minimum possible time in between the
transmission events, T ∗maxN denotes the maximum amount of
time elapsed between the transmission events. If the digital
network transmits the data at a high rate, then T ∗minN is small,
otherwise T ∗minN is large for a slow data rate transmission
network. The T ∗maxN denotes the maximum delay time in
transmitting the data in a digital network.
The mathematical model of the digital network is given in
equation (14) and (15).







, m+N = vN when τN ≤ 0 (15)
At every ti, the information vN available at the input side
of the communication link is transferred over the digital
network. The internal variable mN is updated for each trans-
mission event and keeps the information at the output of
the network and remains constant between the communica-
tion events. The internal variable mN not only maintains the
recently transmitted information but also previously transmit-
ted information. This digital network is an interface between
a cyber and physical system that interconnects the continuous
and discrete dynamics. The model of the digital network
is represented by the combination of both difference and
differential equations by hybrid inclusions method. This is
usually employed in CPS for modelling the digital network
as given in equation (16)-(18)
λ̇ ∈ FI (λ,w) when (λ,w) ∈ CI (16)
λ+ ∈ GI (λ,w) when (λ,w) ∈ DI (17)
ψ = ϕ(λ) (18)
where λ denotes the state, w denotes the input signal,
ψ denotes the output, FI denotes the continuous dynamics
on CI , and GI denotes the discrete dynamics on DI of the
digital interface.
4) COMBINING MODELS OF CYBER AND PHYSICAL
COMPONENTS
The complete mathematical modelling of the CPS is obtained
by the interconnection of the models of individual cyber
and physical components with interfaces [58], [65], [66].
Fig. 4 shows the feedback interconnection modelling of CPS.
FIGURE 4. CPPS interconnection modelling.
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The individual models of the CPS are interconnected to
obtain the complete mathematical model of CPS, which com-
bines the continuous and discrete dynamics through combi-
nations of differential and difference equation form or hybrid
inclusion form.
B. CPPS INTERACTION MODELLING (EFFECT OF
PHYSICAL AND CYBER SYSTEMS HAS ON EACH OTHER)
The interaction between cyber and physical systems plays
a significant role in the efficient control of CPPS. In the
past research works, the assumptions about the interactions
phenomena in CPPS are left implicitly or unspecified in
the system design. This leads to catastrophic failure in the
safety-critical systems like CPPS. It is necessary to explicitly
specify the assumptions of interactions and integrate the inter-
action model with the design of CPPS to ensure the safety
of the system. In this section, the different types of CPPS
interaction model are presented. From the literature review,
the CPPS interaction model is broadly classified into four
types, as shown in Fig. 6. They are i) Graphical Model ii)
MechanismModel iii) Probabilistic model and iv) Simulation
Model.
1) GRAPHICAL MODEL
The graphical model gives the visualization-based relation-
ship between the physical and cyber systems. It helps to
construct the structure of the electric power grid and sup-
ports to analyze the operation of the power grid from the
various attacks. The following section gives the different
types of graphical modelling methods, quantitative analysis
of variables involved in eachmodel, and theories of individual
models with graphical illustration are presented as follows.
a: GRAPH THEORY-BASED MODEL
In CPPS, the electrical power system components like gener-
ator, circuit breaker, protective relay, and loads are connected
through transmission lines, whereas the cyber system consists
of cyber components are connected through the communi-
cation networks. In order to monitor and control CPPS, it is
assumed that each component in the physical system is inte-
grated with the cyber node. It transmits the component state
information to the remote-control centre through routers and
switches, as shown in Fig. 5. Once the information is received
in the control centre, the information is processed, and the
control signal is generated then sent through the routers to
the control devices like Flexible AC Transmission System
(FACTS) devices, etc.
Given that the one-on-one relationship between the physi-
cal system and the cyber system, the failure of the physical or
cyber systems affects other systems or vice versa. The graph
theory-based method would be the best method to study the
internal relations between the physical and cyber systems in
CPPS. A graph consists of a set of vertices (V ) and edges (E).
Based on the principle of graph theory technique the physical
components are considered as vertices Vp and the transmis-
sion line connecting the physical components are considered
as an edges Ep which form the directed sparsely connected
graph, Gp = (Vp,Ep) [67]–[69]. Similarly, the cyber com-
ponents like routers, servers, computing clusters in cyber
systems are considered as vertices Vc and the wireless/wired
communication between the cyber components is considered
as an edges Ec which form the directed sparsely connected
graph Gc = (Vc,Ec) [70], [71]. Fig. 7 represents the example
of graph theory-based modelling of CPPS. The vertices are
energy storage devices, while the edges represent the energy
flow (power flow) between the two vertices.
The edges are represented as a directional arrow to indicate
the positive power flow as Pini for i ∈ {1, 2} from the head
vertex V headj to the tail vertex V
tail
j . The V
s
∈ RNs and V t ∈
RNt denotes the source and sink vertices, respectively [72].
In the cyber system, the vertices are data nodes, while the
edges represent the information flow between the two ver-
tices [26]. The edges are represented as a directional arrow to
indicate the information flow as I ini for i ∈ {1, 2}, as shown
in Fig. 7. The power system contingency like transmission
line outage is represented by the removal of edges in the graph
Gp whereas the removal of the vertex Vc represents the failure
of the cyber node from the graphGc. The graphical model of a
CPPS is represented as a directed topology graph. The physi-
cal and cyber system state variables are considered as a ‘‘data
node,’’ and the information flow between the physical and
cyber system is considered as an ‘‘information edge.’’ The
graph theory model is integrated with the dynamic system
theory model to analyse the effect of cyber disturbances on
the power system components [73].
b: FINITE STATE MACHINE (FSM) MODEL
FSM or Finite State Automata, or simply called as a State
Machine, is a mathematical model of the computation. The
FSM found in many applications that perform the prede-
termined sequence of actions based on the sequence of the
events presented to the FSM. It is at any one of the states
from the list of a finite number of states at any given time.
It changes from one state to another state when triggered by
the inputs: the change of one state to another state is called
state transition. There are two types of FSM: Deterministic
FSM (DFSM) and Non-Deterministic FSM (NDFSM) [74].
A five-element tuple represents a deterministic FSM:
(Q, 6, δ, q0,F) (19)
where Q represents the finite set of states, 6 is a finite non-
empty input, δ is a series of transition functions, q0 represents
the initial state, and F is the set of accepting (final) states.
There must be one transition for each state when the input is
given from the set 6. The DFSM is represented in Fig. 8.
Similar to DFSM, the NDFSM is represented by an above
five-element tuple. Unlike DFSM,NDFSMhasmultiple tran-
sitions for each state for input from the set 6. Additionally,
NDFSM has a null transition represented by ε, which allows
the machine to transition from one state to another state
without reading the input from the set 6. The NDFSM is
shown in Fig. 9.
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FIGURE 5. Interaction mechanism in CPPS.
FIGURE 6. Classification of CPPS interaction modelling.
In the CPPS, the state transition occurs in both physical
and cyber systems for different events under different con-
ditions [75], [76]. The FSM generates the State Chart Dia-
gram (SCD) for cyber and physical systems, which represents
the dynamic behaviour of the system through state transitions
throughout its life cycle. SCD is used to make the power
system operation process clear and visible and analyze the
critical interactions in CPPS qualitatively. In [49], the usual
sequential order of the control commands is modelled as
{ti, ti+1}where {t1, t2, . . . tn} are the defined set of transitions.
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FIGURE 7. Graph theory-based modelling of CPPS.
FIGURE 8. Deterministic FSM.
FIGURE 9. Non-deterministic FSM.
The false sequential logic attack on the SCADA system
changes the control commands as {ti+1, ti}. The detailed anal-
ysis of how this attack perturbs the behaviour of the physical
system can be obtained by SCD. In [39], the FSM is used to
enhance the performance of the aircraft electrical distribution
system by reconfiguring the control strategy under different
operating conditions and fault scenarios [77]. The advanced
features of FSM modelling of CPPS are flexible to model the
interactions, easy to move from abstract to code execution,
low processor overhead, and easy determination of reacha-
bility of a state.
c: PETRI NET MODEL
The Petri net is a mathematical modelling language for the
distributed and parallel system to describe the state changes
and transitions that occur in the system. It is a class of
discrete-event dynamic system which represents the relation-
ship between events, conditions, and its control behaviour in
a large-scale system. The Petri net model is the best suitable
language tool to study the interaction phenomena between
the continuous nature of the physical system and the discrete
nature of the cyber system in CPPS [78], [79]. Petri net is
a graph-based model to illustrate the control behaviour of
CPPS exhibiting the asynchronous, concurrency, and dis-
tributed event characteristics in their operation. The FSM
can be converted into the Petri net model and vice versa to
investigate the cascading failure in the system [80]. The Petri
net model consists of four fundamental components, such as
place, transition, arc, and token, as shown in Fig. 10.
FIGURE 10. Basic petri net components.
The place is represented graphically as a circle, transitions
as a bar, arcs are directed line segments, and tokens as dots.
The places (P) are used to represent the components and
their state in CPPS. The transitions (T) consisting of input
functions (I) and Output functions (O) are used to describe
the discrete events in CPPS that may result in different states.
The arcs denote the relationship that exists between the places
and transitions. Finally, the tokens are used to define the
active state of the Petri net, which forms the marking of the
net (MP).
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FIGURE 11. Petri net example.
The model of the Petri net can be described by both graph-
ically and using set notations. Using the above notations the
Petri net is described as a five-tuple, M = (P,T , I ,O,MP),
where P represents the set of places, P = {p1, p2, . . . pn},
T represents the set of transitions, T = {t1, t2, . . . tm}, I
represents the input function for all the transitions, I =
{It1, It2, . . . Itm}, O represents the output function for all the
transitions, O = {Ot1,Ot2, . . .Otm}, and MP represents the
marking of places with tokens. The initial marking of places
is referred to as MP0. Each place has either zero tokens (or)
some integer number of tokens. An example Petri net graph is
shown in Fig. 11 can be described by the mathematical model
using the previous notation as [81]:
M = {P,T , I ,O,MP}
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}
T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
I (t1) = {p1}
I (t2) = {p2, p3, p5}
I (t3) = {p3}
I (t4) = {p4}
O (t1) = {p2, p3, p5}
O (t2) = {p5}
O (t3) = {p4}
O (t4) = {p2, p3}
MP = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)

(20)
The cyberattack or cyber intrusion in CPPS is a stochastic
event rather than a deterministic event. The stochastic event
can be modelled by the stochastic Petri net model by intro-
ducing the stochastic time-varying delay parameter between
enabling and firing conditions of the state transition mech-
anism [82]. The analysis of the impacts of cyberattacks on
CPPS is based on the tokens in the Petri net model, which
are indistinguishable. Therefore, coloured Petri net (CPN)
model is used to analyse and identify the type of cyberattack
on CPPS. In CPN, each token is appended with a data value
called a token colour, which describes the data type and its
complex operations so that the cyberattacks can be detected
by a unique identity in the model [83]. A stochastic CPN
model is proposed to analyze the cyberattacks on large-scale
CPPS and described the threat propagation process in CPPS
quantitatively [84]. In [85], a hierarchical method-based con-
struction of the Petri net model for a large-scale power sys-
tem is proposed. Many smaller Petri nets are constructed
separately for each subsystem through different domain
experts.
The Petri net model describing the phenomena of black-
out occurred in the U.S. and Canada on August 14, 2003,
is shown in Fig. 12. It represents a coordinated cyber-attack
occurred initially on units control system (P1) and finally, the
propagation of failure causes the Sammis-star line outage and
other transmission line outages in northern Ohio (P6). The
main drawback of the Petri net model is modelling of the
large-scale CPPS is very difficult due to an increase in the size
of the state-space, and also the computation time increases
exponentially with the increase of the system size.
d: NETWORK ATTACK MODEL
In the last decade, the CPPS adopting more advanced ICTs
to improve the operating efficiency and reliability of the sys-
tem. The ICTs are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks launched
by malicious insiders or national cyber attackers and there-
fore cause serious cybersecurity problems in the CPPS. The
cyber-attack onCPPS refers to the attack behaviours perform-
ing an organized action of tracking the communication net-
work or control commands without permission and exploiting
the vulnerability of the system to destroy or limit its func-
tion. These cyber-attacks degrade the smart grid performance
and leads to system blackouts. Due to the complex interac-
tion characteristics between the physical and cyber systems,
the failure of the cyber network creates serious consequences
in the physical system. The behaviour of the CPPS may be
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FIGURE 12. Petri net model for hypothetical attacks in blackout example.
changed due to the network attacks and make the system
in an unsafe condition that damages the system. Therefore,
it is necessary to review the different types of cyber-attack
model for CPPS to analyze the impacts of cyber-attacks and
its consequences on weakening the CPPS functions such as
safety, stability, and economy of the system through mod-
elling and simulation approaches. The cyber-attack model
helps to understand and evaluate the resilience of CPPS
against cyber-attack. The power system engineers use this
model: i) To identify the problem from the level of component
and subsystem and respond to the cyber-attack on CPPS in
advance ii) To improve the situation awareness and protect
the CPPS from the future cyber-attacks iii) To evaluate the
security status of a cyber domain of the power grid and
iv) To design and develop more resilient CPPS. The fol-
lowing section presents the different types of network attack
modelling in CPPS.
2) ATTACK TREE
The attack tree shows all the possible paths for cyberattacks
in the power system in a graphical manner. It helps to provide
a different way of cyber network intrusion and describes the
process of cyber-attack structurally and intuitively [86], [87].
The vulnerability and risk assessment of critical parts of the
CPPS can be done by the attack tree method [88], [89].
In [86], the attack tree model was deployed to construct
the cyber-physical threat model with respect to the power
system contingencies. However, the attack tree method is
suitable only for modelling a restricted type of attack and not
suitable for modelling simultaneous attacks or coordinated
attack scenarios on multiple components. In [90], the attack
tree is transformed into the Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) model
for the effective capturing of the network attack.
Fig. 13 represents the attack tree for smart grid applica-
tions [91]. Level 1 represents the constant power delivery
to the customer without any disturbance. Level 2 represents
the physical system consequences that lead to the power grid
blackout; for instance, changes in reference value of exciter
and prime mover into abnormal values. Level 3 represents
the cyberattacks on CPPS that lead to physical consequences.
By compromising the SCADA and Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU), the attacker controls the exciter and prime mover,
affecting the power generating system. Finally, level 4 rep-
resents the attack technique to perform the attack.
3) ATTACK GRAPH
The attack graph represents the behaviour of an attacker and
explores the different ways that the attacker can exploit the
system vulnerabilities to attain the desired state. An attack
graph consists of a collection of attack scenarios in the
computer networks, whereas each scenario represents the
sequence of actions performed by an attacker to intrude into
the system with a particular goal of service interruption,
access to the confidential database, access to the main host,
etc. This model utilizes the information of the network topol-
ogy and calculates the probability of flaw that can be identi-
fied by an attacker to implement the intrusion and penetration.
The system operator uses the attack graphs to identify the
suitable security measures to defend their systems. If the
size of the network is increasing, an automatic generation
method is applied by the attack graph model to identify the
network flaws for modelling of large-scale complex network
attack behaviour. The attack graph model is used to per-
form the security assessment for the power systems control
unit [92]. The automatic generation method is combined
with an attack graph model to quantitatively evaluate the
impact of cascading failures in the CPPS [93]. The Bayesian
attack graph model is used to assess the attack procedure
and the likelihood of compromise of the cyber components
in smart grid systems with the consideration of uncertainty
in cyber-attacks [94]. The attack graph model is useful for
the operators to analyze the patterns of sequential cyber
topological attacks in identifying the critical cyber-attacks
thereby cascading outages can be avoided in the CPPS [267].
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FIGURE 13. Attack tree.
The attack graph serves various applications like intrusion
detection, security defence, network security, and forensic
analysis, etc. Overall, it gives a bird’s eye view of every attack
scenario in CPPS that can lead to a critical security breach.
The advantage of the attack graph is taking into account of
local vulnerabilities through the interaction effects and global
vulnerabilities through interconnection effects and verymuch
useful for security analysis of power control systems. The
calculation of system vulnerabilities based on the connection
model of the attack graph is shown in Fig. 14. The connec-
tion model of the attack graph includes serial, parallel, and
series-parallel complex. Table 2 highlights the main charac-
teristics of different schemes in attack graph modelling for
cyber-physical systems, and Table 3 presents the detailed
taxonomy of network attack models [98], [114].
The vulnerability function of the state (S) transfer is
defined as;
Pv (c) = P (C ≤ c) = 1− e−λc (21)
where c represents the equivalent cost of attacks,C represents
the equivalent cost of attacks after achieving the objective,
λ represents the vulnerability factor which expresses the
difficult level of a successful attack [92]. The state transfer
(cyber-attack) becomes more complicated when λ becomes
smaller. If the value of the functionPv (c) becomes bigger, the
vulnerability of the target system becomes bigger; therefore,
the probability of successful cyber-attacks on CPPS becomes
higher. The mathematical model of vulnerabilities is defined
as follows:
a) Serial Model












where ∀i 6= j→ λi 6= λj, n ≥ 2.
b) Parallel Model




c) Series-Parallel complex model:
Traversing through all the paths from the initial state to
the target state, each and every feasible path is a serial model,
and the calculation between each feasible path from the initial
state to the final state is treated as a parallel model.
4) STATE TRANSITION DIAGRAM
In this model, the behaviour of an attack is modelled
as a Markov decision process (model checking prediction
method) similar to the methods based on attack graphs.
In the Markov process, the states are unobservable (hidden);
hence we cannot observe the state of the model directly,
but the output of the model depends on the current state.
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FIGURE 14. Connection model of the attack graph. (a) Serial model. (b) Parallel model. (c) Series-parallel complex model.
The Markov model predicts the attack behaviour considering
the probability of the state transition of the system under
different attack behaviours for evaluating the system vulner-
abilities [30], [117]. This model describes all the types of
attacks and meet the detection requirements of CPPS. Also,
the multiple system states, the attack behaviour that leads
to change in the system state, and the changing trend in the
system states can be captured clearly and exactly by using this
model. Markov models are well suited for intrusion detec-
tion and attack prediction even in the case of unobservable
states & transitions and do not require the complete state
information of the system.
Fig. 15 shows an example of a Markov model for attack
prediction, which is visualized as a graph [118]. It repre-
sents four states of attack progress from a normal state to a
successful compromise (cyber-attack). The attack sequence
consists of different classes such as enumeration, host & ser-
vice probing, exploitation, etc. Based on the attack sequences,
we can predict the next state of an attacker and can find the
most likely path from the present state mode. From the most
FIGURE 15. Hidden Markov model states for predicting cyber attacks.
likely path, the actions of the attacker can be predicted, and a
probability threshold is assigned for each attack path to avoid
the false positive so that the lowest probability is discarded
and such paths are not evaluated for further actions.
5) MECHANISM MODEL
The combination of continuous event dynamic behaviour sys-
tem and discrete event static behaviour system, the mixture
of energy flow and information flow, and the interactions
between the cyber and physical systems in CPPS can be
analysed by using the mechanism models.
a: ANALYTICAL MODEL
In the CPPS, both power devices and cyber devices are ener-
gized by independent power supplies for reliability consider-
ations. The interaction characteristics between the cyber and
physical system in CPPS is influenced by the impacts of the
cyber network reliability (i.e.) influencing the power mea-
surement signals and control signal information. If an attacker
initiates an attack, for example, false data injection attacks the
attacker can control the IEDs, RTU, SCADA, etc. and tamper
the critical information about the status of the power grid
through synchronized measurement data, oscillatory moni-
toring results, electricity regulation pricing, and state estima-
tion reports, etc. In the analytical model framework, the cyber
network failure is generally considered as a data fluctuation
(bad data, outlier, missing data, etc.) relevant to some function
of the power system and implement a specific power system
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TABLE 2. Characteristics of different schemes in attack graph modelling for cyber-physical systems.
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TABLE 2. (Continued.) Characteristics of different schemes in attack graph modelling for cyber-physical systems.
application analysis corresponding to the changes in mea-
surement information of CPPS. Table 4 lists some analytical
models of power system applications under cyber-attacks.
The PMU is a device used to estimate the real-time volt-
age and current phasor values of CPPS using a common
time source through a Global Positioning System (GPS)
for synchronization. The PMU is an essential element in
the Wide-Area Measurement System (WAMS) of CPPS for
monitoring, protection, and control applications. Using the
phasor values (magnitude and angle of voltage and current),
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TABLE 3. Detailed taxonomy of network attack model.
we can capture the wide-area snapshot of the CPPS and real-
time behavior of the power system. The applications of PMU
in power systems are voltage stability monitoring, oscilla-
tion stability analysis, state estimation, wide-area monitor-
ing & control, var optimization, blackout analysis, real-time
electricity pricing, and transmission line fault detection, etc.
Using the time-synchronized data from PMU, we can build
the analytical model and analyze the impact of cyber net-
work attacks on the function module [119]. The analytical
model can also be built to analyze the tampered data on
power system measurements on voltage stability, Automatic
Generation Control (AGC), and power system frequency
control [120], [121]. Besides, the analytical model can also
be used to assess the loss of revenue quantitatively when
the confidential data is tampered from the power system
measurements by setting the analytical model to parameters
such as the electricity price information and revenue of the
power system operator [122].
In CPPS, the actual data is first gathered in the WAC
centre. After performing the data cleansing operation and
removing the ambient disturbances by state estimator, the cor-
responding data is used by the other advanced power system
applications. The advanced cyber-attacks performed by the
attacker easily bypasses the bad data detection and identifi-
cation module from the state estimator, which can eliminate
only ambient disturbances. The false data injection attack
effectively bypasses the intrusion monitoring and detection
system and tamper the confidential data coming from the
state estimator. This impacts the performance of the power
system application module, which is solely based on these
data sources. By developing the analytical model for CPPS
state estimation, the impacts of cyber-attacks on state esti-
mation results can be assessed quantitatively [123], [124],
and the performance of the function module can be evaluated
quantitatively based on these changes in the state estimation
results. Regarding cyber-attacks, the state estimation model
can use both AC power flow and the DC power flow. In the
case of the AC power flowmodel, the process takesmore time
and does not converge to the optimal global solution [69],
[125], [126]. On comparing the results of ac power flow
with dc power flow in state estimation model for cyber-attack
analysis, it indicates that the attacker using the dc model for
a specific type of false data injection attack at the RTU level
introduces more errors in the measurements which triggers
the bad data monitoring and detection mechanism. But in the
case of the AC power flow model, the non-linear equations
of the state estimation model are robust to this type of attack,
which is advantageous to the system operator only if the
attacker does not know system data, which would allow the
attacker to perform the attack analysis. If an attacker is well
aware of the system data, then he could be able to execute an
attack that is unnoticed through AC state estimation [127].
b: DYNAMIC SYSTEM BASED MODELS
In the CPPS stability analysis, the physical system is mod-
elled by differential equations with energy flow, and the dif-
ference equations model the cyber system with information
flow. The perturbation effect on the physical system from the
cyber system is modelled by the stimulant of the generator
states (frequency and angle) in the rotor swing equation of
the generator. In [126], an attacker constructed the attack
vector for stealth cyber-attack to control the synchronous gen-
erator in the cyber controlled Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs) to continuously maintain the physical instability of
the smart grid. The CPPS can be modelled as a closed-loop
dynamic system through constructing the dynamic models of
the power system components such as exciter, power system
stabilizer, prime mover, synchronous generator, High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC) and FACTS devices, with an interac-
tion between information flow and energy flow. The closed-
loop system analysis is performed for WADC of CPPS.
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TABLE 4. Common analytical models of power system applications under cyber attacks.
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FIGURE 16. Elementary variable structure system example. (a) Elementary power system. (b) Block diagram.
It utilizes the measurements from PMU, but the communi-
cation delays between the PMU and the control centre are
significant, which affects the CPPS stability. In [127], [128],
the authors have utilized the delay-dependent stability anal-
ysis method for eigenvalue analysis of CPPS. The CPPS
is modelled by the directed graph method, and using the
dynamic system equation, the state information of each power
node is determined [73]. If the cyber-attacks have triggered in
CPPS, the state variation of the power node can be evaluated
by numerical simulation.
c: VARIABLE STRUCTURE SYSTEM MODEL
The status of the circuit breaker switches decides the topology
of CPPS. If the attacker attacks the power system switches
the topology of the power grid is changed continuously,
and its dynamics depend upon the value of switching sig-
nals. The variable structure theory is used to identify the
weakness of the CPPS when the switching attack signals
reconfigure the grid. It captures the interactions between
the cyber and physical systems in CPPS effectively and
demonstrate how the switching vulnerability disrupts the
operations of CPPS within a short period. In the Fig. 16 it
represents when the power system switches change its posi-
tion between Z1(load1) and Z2(load2) it stimulates the effect
of changing system dynamics between f1(x, t) and f2(x, t)
respectively [129].
In [130], the authors have demonstrated the distributed
smart grid attack on CPPS to destabilize the power sys-
tem components using variable structure system theory. The
attacker controls the multiple circuit breaker within a power
system through cyber intrusion to destabilize the synchronous
generator by state-dependent breaker switching. They utilize
the localized state information to identify the sliding surface
of the CPPS then destroy the stability condition of a par-
ticular sliding mode, which triggers the transient instability
condition of the targeted synchronous generator. The attacker
intrudes through a single breaker then reaches multiple and
coordinated switch-case attacks, which leads to a stealthier
and wide-area cascading failure. In [32], the authors have
designed the optimal partial feedback based switching data
injection attacks for CPPSs. The goal of an attacker is to
manipulate the control signals, and alter the attack locations
persistently to degrade the CPPS performance with a min-
imum cost. Using convex relaxation and pontryagin’s maxi-
mum principle the authors have proved that for all the optimal
switch inputs a switching condition can be derived to select
the optimal attack locations.
d: MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODEL
With the increasing number of integrations of DERs into
CPPS, the distribution characteristics of the CPPS become
very clear, the power system operators exchanging the data
among them very, and the control scheme becomes of great
significance. The traditional centralized mode of control is
very difficult and inefficient to control the different types of
DERs in the CPPS. The centralized control scheme requires
the complete mathematical model of the CPPS. With the con-
tinuous expansion of the modern CPPS, the design of a single
centralized controller for various DERs have a chance to
failure, since no other sources to control the system, the CPPS
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becomes unstable. The cost of implementing the centralized
controller is very high [16]. This motivates to develop amulti-
agent-based control for CPPS, which solves the cooperative
optimization problem of various DERs integration into CPPS.
In the multi-agent system model, each physical entity is
monitored by an agent and communicates with other agents
for interchanging the information to attain the common
objective.
In [131], the authors had investigated the goal-based
Holonic Multi-Agent System (HMAS) for optimal opera-
tion of CPPS by reactive power control method at solar
photovoltaic installations. Using the same HMAS, the state
estimation of CPPS can also be performed by leveraging
the different measurements from smart meters. In [132],
the authors have presented the multi-agent-based security
enhancement of protection schemes in CPPS by detecting
and identifying the cyber threats on protection systems of
power grids. The multi-agent model utilizes the properties
of physical and cyber systems in CPPS to distinguish the
cyber-attacks from the physical faults and thereby to improve
the cybersecurity and stability. In [55], the authors have pro-
posed the multi-agent-based cyber-physical control frame-
work for transient stability enhancement. In this framework,
a cyber-physical delay resilient controller is designed, which
adapts its structure depending on the value of latency and the
state of the cyber component in CPPS. In [133], the authors
have investigated the application of a distributed averaging
based integral (DAI) controller for CPPS. The uncertainties
of the cyber and communication layer and their effect on
robustness and performance were considered. Based on these
uncertainties, a delay-dependent condition for robust stability
of DAI controlled CPPS concerning communication delays,
link failures, and packet loss is derived.
6) PROBABILISTIC MODEL
The probabilistic models are classified into two types, such as
uncertainty model and the game-theoretic model. In CPPS,
both physical and cyber systems events are probabilistic in
nature. These events occurring in the physical and cyber sys-
tems cannot be narrated exactly. In such a situation, the uncer-
tainty model can be used to describe the behaviour of CPPS.
Meanwhile, the CPPS operation involves various stakehold-
ers, making important decisions under uncertain conditions.
If the interactions exist among the multiple decision-making
stakeholders for the operation of CPPS, each one of them
implements their strategy for their benefits depending upon
the existing information. The game-theoretic type models are
used to describe this kind of probabilistic situation.
a: UNCERTAINTY MODEL
The interactions between the physical and cyber systems in
CPPS are uncertain, which includes the direct and indirect
impacts of cyber system unreliability through cyber-attacks
on power systems [137] as well as through the malfunction-
ing of the cyber systems [135], [138], [139] in wide-area
monitoring and protection systems. The degradation of the
performance of the cyber systemmay be due to many reasons
such as failure of power source to cyber systems, time syn-
chronization error among the cyber systems, breakdown of
ICTs and improper configuration of SCADA, etc.
The cyber systems can be modelled by three methods,
namely Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) method, discrete
Markov Decision Process (MDP), and Semi Markov Process
(SMP). The RBD method is a practical method for construct-
ing the reliability model for cyber systems. In [134], the RBD
method is used to calculate the cyber system reliability quan-
titatively, and a multi-state Markov chain method is used to
analyze the effects of cyber systems failures on the power
system components. In [30], the cyber-attacks are modelled
by the discrete MDP and generate all the possible attack
scenarios. The attacker uses the same Markov process to
perform the state transition. Once it is successful, the attacker
gets the rewards with a certain probability. Then estimating
the current security state of the system using this Markov
process model and combined with cyber intrusion and detec-
tion system alerts. In [117], the cyber-attacks on SCADA
systems are modelled as SMP. In addition to that, the time
delay and time-varying delay in the communication system,
including the traffic delay with Probability Distribution Func-
tion (PDF), minimum deterministic delay, and processing
delay with PDF, are adopted deeply into the modelling of the
communication system [18]. In [134], the impacts of cyber
layer failure (protection and monitoring failure) are added
to the reliability evaluation of the power system compo-
nents. A multi-state Markov chain model is used to build the
structure of electrical components considering the topology
of the cyber layer with its reliability functions and actual
protection and monitoring strategies simultaneously. From
the complete model of CPPS, the reliability information of
each component and subsystems in CPPS are collected. Then
the probability table (P–Table) is used to express the system
reliability [137], [138], and the state transition diagram is
used to model the state transition probability of each compo-
nent in the CPPS [135], [139]. In addition to that, a Bayesian
structure can also be used for reliability assessment of CPPS
by Bayesian network probabilistic reasoning [136].
b: GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
In recent years the cyberattacks on the physical power system
are increasing the attention worldwide. The attackers target
the ICTs of CPPS through cyberattacks, and the defend-
ers tried to protect the power system using a cyber-attack
detection and mitigation scheme. The attack detection and
mitigation game-theoretical model is used tomodel the cyber-
physical interaction process and also applied for risk, vul-
nerability, and threat analysis. The defenders involved in the
operation of CPPS makes their decisions for their benefits
in a competitive situation by allocating limited resources.
The competitive relationship among the participants of CPPS
can be modelled as a Colonel Blotto Game [117], Zero-Sum
Game [142], and Stochastic Game [141]. In [143], the authors
investigated the vulnerability analysis of CPPS under terrorist
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threat, assuming the attacker knows the complete information
about CPPS. The problem is formulated as a mixed-integer
nonlinear bilevel program with upper and lower level opti-
mization. In the upper level of optimization, the terrorist
tries to maximize the damage to the power systems, which
is measured in terms of the level of load shedding. On the
other hand, in the lower level of optimization, the power
system operator tries to minimize the damage by optimal
operation of the power system and capable of modifying the
network topology in case of severe cyber-attacks. In [144],
the authors analysed the bi-level model of coordinated cyber-
physical attacks on power systems. This two-step cyber-
attacks comprising topology-preserving attacks and load
redistribution attacks, ensuring the bad data measurements
are undetectable. In [145], the authors investigated the secu-
rity assessment of electricity distribution networks with vul-
nerable DERs nodes. The game-theoretical model is used
to model a 3-stage defender-attacker-defender (DAD) tri-
level optimization problem. In stage 1, the defender chooses
the cybersecurity measures to secure a subset of DERs
node; in stage 2, the attacker compromises the vulnera-
ble DERs nodes, and, in stage 3, the defender responds
by taking a controlling action by the rescheduling of
loads [146].
From the past research works, the game-theoretic model
assumes that the level of attacker and defender are the same,
and their actions also similar. Practically this assumption
is invalid; the attacker observes the defender cybersecurity
framework then decides the attack countermeasures. This
asymmetric behavior between the attacker and defender can
be modelled as a static infinite Stackelberg game-theoretic
model [147]. Using this model, the interactions between the
different security agents can be represented in the cyber layer,
and for the physical layer, the full-information H-infinity
min-max control with packet drops is modelled by the Stack-
elberg game model. In the dynamic attack detection and
mitigation scheme, the game is not finished at once and using
the same attack structure, the attack persists many times.
In this regard, the attacker’s history is recorded and anal-
ysed then the decisions can be taken based on the attacker’s
actions. This process be continued as long as the attacker
and defender are opposed to each other in their long-term
interest. This interaction between cyber attackers and phys-
ical defenders can be modelled as an iterated game model
in CPPS, where the results are completely different from the
one-time game [140]. Almost the previous game-theoretical
model analysis assumes that the control is optimal, and
the physical systems dynamics model is accurate. In CPPS,
the dynamics of the physical systems are usually modelled
by differential equations with energy flow, and the cyber
systems are modelled by difference equations with informa-
tion flow. In [126], the authors have proposed a differential
game-theoretic model to demonstrate the worst-case attack
by an attacker to disrupt the transient stability of CPPS by
leveraging the control over DERs, with the consideration of
full dynamics of the power system.
7) SIMULATION MODEL
The continuous nature of the physical system and the discrete
nature of the cyber system complicates the research in CPPSs.
The simulation model supports the power system operators
to realize the integrated modelling of the dynamic behaviour
of the continuous system and static behaviour of the discrete
system. The software used for building the simulation model
of the power system is discussed in detail in Section III.
C. CPPS INTERDEPENDENT MODELLING (DEGREE OF
PHYSICAL AND CYBER SYSTEMS DEPENDS ON EACH
OTHER)
The CPPS consists of a large number of physical devices
and cyber devices which form a large-scale interdependent
complex system. The interface relationship between the cyber
and physical devices is modelled as interdependent modelling
of CPPS, which changes over time. The interdependent CPPS
is divided into the three-layer structure, namely the physical
layer, cyber layer, and interface-mapping layer, as shown
in Fig. 17. The physical layer node represents the generator,
transformer, substation, etc., and the transmission lines in
the electric power grid network are represented as a physical
layer edge. The cyber layer nodes composed of computational
systems, communication equipment’s and control algorithms
where its main function is to monitor and control CPPS. The
network edges represent the communication links between
the cyber nodes. There are two types of interdependencies
in CPPS based on cyber layer nodes, namely one-to-one
interdependency and one-to-multiple interdependency [148].
In the one-to-one interdependency, each physical node is
monitored (sensing the status of the physical node) and con-
trolled (issuing the control commands) by the single cyber
node [149]. Then the control centre collects the information
from the distributed cyber nodes. In the one-to-multiple inter-
dependencies, each physical node is monitored by more than
one cyber node, which is very much useful for securing the
data against cyber-attacks [150].
In [151], the interdependent modelling of CPPS is used to
analyze the effects of cyber-attack and defense in smart city
applications. A smart city integrates several interdependent
CPS that operate in a coordinated manner to achieve the
global objective of the city’s residents. These large-scale
interdependent CPS are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks due
to these interdependencies, which can be lead to cascading
failures and serious effects on the city. A novel approach
is proposed to allocate the security resources for the vari-
ous cyber components of an interdependent CPS to protect
the system against cyber-attacks. In case the attacker not
aware of the CPS interdependencies, the defender can have
a higher payoff compared to the case in which the attacker
knows the complete information. In [152], a realistic model
called HINT (Heterogeneous Interdependent NeTworks) is
proposed to study the evolution of cascading failures in the
interdependencies between the power grid and the commu-
nication network taking into account the heterogeneity of
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FIGURE 17. Interdependencies within CPPS.
the networks as well as their complex interdependencies.
Using this model, the failure propagation is accurately fore-
casted and improved the network robustness. A quantitative
analysis of the impact of interdependency on power system
vulnerability is proposed in [153] considering the strong
coupling between the power grid and the communication
system. A reliability modelling of the smart grid is developed
considering the cyber-physical interdependencies among the
components and shown that the flawed cyberinfrastructure
results in lower reliability of the smart grid compared to the
conventional power grid with less advanced control [154].
In [268], based on the interdependence between the cyber
and physical networks, a risk area prediction model for CPPS
is developed using dependent markov chain. Then the cross-
adaptive gray wolf optimization algorithm is utilized to opti-
mize the prediction model to accurately reflect the actual
system risk propagation process. In [155], based on the net-
work interdependencies relation and physical layer operation,
the modelling of cascading failures and its mitigation in
the CPPS is presented. The CPPS is modelled as an inter-
dependent complex network-based model incorporating the
physical layer power flow analysis, cyber layer information,
edge capacity checks, delay analysis, transmission analysis,
and indirect interaction mechanism between the two layers.
The physical and cyber layer usually operates without the
interdependencies from the other. Since the two layers are
different in topology and operational relations, it is necessary
to consider the interdependency effect and should apply the
mitigation strategies simultaneously in both layers.
The cyber-physical coupling failure in the strong interde-
pendent CPPS increases the risk of smart grids when the
physical outages remedial control is failed due to a simultane-
ous cyber-side failure. In this situation, to enhance the robust-
ness of smart grids concerning the possible cyber-physical
coupling failures, the critical information about the CPPS
should be transmitted through a reliable path to ensure
its accessibility. A CPS robust routing model with cyber-
physical sensitivity-based information flow is proposed.
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It improves the performance and robustness in power flow
corrective control on comparing with conventional routing
based shortest-path model [156].
III. SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR MODELLING AND
SIMULATION OF CPPS
The CPPS is a complex system with the large-scale inte-
gration of renewable sources (e.g., PV, Wind), Controllable
Loads (e.g., Smart Building, Electric Vehicle (EV), Batteries,
Heat Pumps, etc.), Digitization of Power System (e.g., AMI),
Multi-domain grid (ICT, Heat, Gas, Electricity) with strong
interconnection and interaction effects. The efficient opera-
tion of CPPS depends upon the close interactions between the
power system and cyber systems [157]. A holistic approach
for CPPS is needed for a comprehensive analysis of interde-
pendent subsystems. The inclusion of the cyber systemmodel
with the power system model is important for the analysis of
complex CPPS involving the dynamics of both the systems
for reliable power delivery to the critical infrastructure [158].
The individual domain of the CPPS can be modelled and
simulated by continuous-time based power system simula-
tion tools and discrete-event based cyber system simulation
tools, as listed in Table 5. However, the CPPS necessitates
an integrated system design for an in-depth analysis of the
interdependencies of ICTs and power systems, which can be
done by the co-simulation tools.
The co-simulation framework involves the joint simula-
tion of simulations in the power system domain and the
cyber system domain in a holistic test-case. It shows the
realistic behavior of CPPS in faulty and extreme conditions
with strict considerations on latency and stability. Using the
co-simulation tool, we can understand the impact of cyber-
attacks on the physical power system operation, whereas the
independent simulation tool supports either the communica-
tion network or the power system but not both together. Thus,
the cyber-physical co-simulator supports exploring the effects
of cyber-attacks on power system dynamics and operation.
The cyber-physical co-simulation tools listed in Table 5 are
useful for the assessment of the cyber-physical security for
CPPS, which simulates the power system and communication
system together. This tool identifies the vulnerable states of
CPPS, bad measurements, and then aids the power system
operator at the control center to take appropriate actions
to minimize the effect of the cyber-attack on smart grid
operation.
Much industrial-grade software tools are available for elec-
tric power systems and cyber system simulation, as listed
in Table 5. A wide range of power system simulation tools are
available for various aspects of power systems, and the cyber
systems are generally modelled as a computer network for
simulation purposes; therefore, network simulation tools are
used for cyber system simulation. The researchers can use the
open-source simulators for CPPS, e.g., OMNeT++, NS-2,
and NS-3, or commercial simulators, e.g., OPNET.
In [159], the researchers had developed the co-simulation
framework by combining OpenDSS and OMNeT++ for
TABLE 5. Simulation tools.
power system simulations and communication networks to
examine the wide-area monitoring and control applications.
In [160], the co-simulation framework is developed for
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TABLE 6. Major cyber-physical attacks in the energy industry sector.
simulating the power routing algorithm in microgrid appli-
cation by combining OMNeT++ with Real-Time Dig-
ital Simulator (RTDS). In [161], the authors presented
the event-driven co-simulation scheme utilizing network
simulator NS2 and OpenDSS for simulation of CPPS.
In [162], the co-simulation environment INSPIRE (Integrated
Co-simulation of Power and ICT systems for Real-Time
Evaluation) with high-level architecture is proposed for real-
izing a combined simulation of both ICT and power sys-
tems. It focuses on analyzing the real-time performance of
wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC)
applications. It applies a co-simulation of a continuous
time-based power system simulator (DIgSILENT PowerFac-
tory), a communication network simulator (OPNET), and
continuous time-based WAMPAC applications modelled in
MATLAB, JAVA, GNU R, and C++. In [163], an informa-
tion flow-based co-simulation model is proposed to analyze
the interdependencies between information and energy flows
and obtaining the quantitative relation between them. Using
this quantitative relation, the planning and operation of cyber
systems are performed. In [164], the co-simulation platform
utilizes OpenDSS and OPNET for power system simulator
and cyber network simulator for testing different communi-
cation technologies. Based on DIgSILENT Power Factory
as a power system simulator and OMNeT++ and INET
framework as a cyber network simulator, a co-simulation
environment is developed in [165] for analyzing the impacts
of communication delay and failure. Another co-simulation
environment named Greenbench presented in [166], which
utilizes PSCAD and OMNeT++ for power and cyber
system simulation to evaluate the impact of data-centric
threats. In [167], a power system and communication net-
work co-simulation framework are proposed using a global
event-driven mechanism (GECO) using PSLF and NS2 sim-
ulators. It improves the practical investigation of the smart
grid and enhances the wide-area measurement and control
schemes. The MATLAB Simulink and OPNET are inte-
grated to study the ICT impacts on the reliability of WAMS
applications [168]. In [169], the Virtual Test Bed (VTB)
software is integrated with OPNET called VPNET for sim-
ulating the remotely controlled power electronic devices in
the system. The electric power and communication synchro-
nizing simulator (EPOCHS) [170] are a combination of PSLF
(commercial electric simulator) and NS-2 (open-source com-
munication network simulator) used formost of the smart grid
co-simulation applications. EPOCHS are used to understand
the impacts of a communication system on a smart grid
relevant to wide-area monitoring, security, and management
applications.
IV. CYBER ATTACKS AND CYBER SECURITY IN CPPS
The electric power grid is one of the most important critical
infrastructures of the nation and also the best example of
the cyber-physical system. It is fully monitored and con-
trolled by advanced information and communication tech-
nologies, which involve the tight integration of computation,
communication, control, and human factors. Even though the
digital technologies monitoring and controlling the electric
power grid more efficiently and reliably, the power grid is
vulnerable to cybersecurity risk and involves the complex
interdependency between cyber and physical systems. The
cyber-attack on the physical power system affects the secure
operation of the power system by changing the information
flow. The initial physical attacks on the power system are dif-
ficult to detect in the large-scale CPPS once it is successfully
coordinatedwith cyber-attacks. The subsequent cyber-attacks
mask these physical attacks, which tend to trigger a cascading
failure across the electric power grid system. Therefore, it is
necessary to analyse the various cyber-attacks and cybersecu-
rity measures in CPPS. The cyber-attack is a major concern
to the critical infrastructure like the electric power grid in
which most of the R&D activities are giving maximum pri-
ority to cybersecurity research globally. From the technical
literature, it is inferred that there is a wide range of advanced
cyber-attacks created for the system like a power grid with
monitoring, controlling, and protecting function, as shown in
Table 6.
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FIGURE 18. Mapping from cyber-attacks to control actions to system impacts.
A. HISTORY OF CYBER ATTACKS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
Recently the various cyber-attack incidents that happened
in the electric power grid around the world, for example,
the Slammer worm of the David-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio,
USA on 2003 [171], SCADA system in the nuclear power
plant attacked by Stuxnet worm in Iran on 2009& 2010 [172],
Ukraine Cyber Attack in December 2015 leading to the loss
of power for about 225,000 customers which were considered
as the worst blackout caused by cyber-attack in power system
history [173],Malware Triton in Saudi Arabian oil refinery on
2017 [174], U.S Cyber Attack in power utilities on March 5,
2019 [175], Cyber Attack in Kudankulam Nuclear Power
Plant, India on 30 October 2019 [176], and Man-in-the-
Middle attack in Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited
(NPCIL), India [177]. The world economic forum ranked
large-scale cyber-attack as fifth among the risks to happen
in the next ten years [178]. The history of the cyber-attacks
alerts the entire world to protect their critical infrastructure
of the nation. Table 6 lists out the major incidents reported
in the energy sector [179]. The electric power grid is a big
networked transmission and distribution system with a huge
load that has a chance of entering of a cyberattack. The
disruption of electricity creates a loss of billions of money
in the country, which directly affects the economy of the
nation and also the GDP growth in the modern global markets
with private attackers. Therefore, it is necessary to develop
the indigenous firewalls/cybersecurity measures against the
cyber-attacks with innovative, resilient control algorithms.
B. CYBER SECURITY FOR CPPS
The CPPS needs cybersecurity at multiple levels, namely
information security, ICTs infrastructure security, and
application-level security [180]. From the past research
works it is identified that the traditional information tech-
nology (IT) security features are not suitable for CPPS and
certain research areas in cybersecurity for CPPS is iden-
tified as: (i) Cyberattack risk modelling and risk mitiga-
tion, (ii) Attack-resilient monitoring, protection and control
algorithms, (iii) Defence against coordinated cyber-attacks,
(iv) AMI infrastructure security, and (v) Simulation models.
The cybersecurity of the power grid consists of Cyber-attack
– Detection, Mitigation, Prevention, and Resilience, which is
the most of R & D’s need for the emerging CPPS. The main
goal of cybersecurity research for the smart grid is to develop
an integrated risk modelling framework that combines phys-
ical system dynamics as well as cyber system dynamics.
Then the model is utilized to assess the impact of a cyberat-
tack on the power system in terms of loss of load, stability
problem, economic loss, or equipment damage. Following
the risk assessment, the next important task is to develop
indigenous cybersecurity algorithms to protect the power
system from various cyber-attacks, including intrusion-based
attacks, denial-of-service attacks, malware-based attacks, and
coordinated attacks. The risk from the cyberattack is eval-
uated by the product of threats, system vulnerabilities, and
their resulting impact, as shown in equation (24).
Risk = [Threat]× [Vulnerability]× [Impact] (24)
The threat can be defined as the presence of potential attacks,
their motivation, and available resources. The vulnerability of
the CPPS depends on the grid’s cyber advanced supporting
infrastructure. Typically, it consists of software, protocols,
networks, and other resources to support the monitoring,
protection, and control functions. The impact on the CPPS is
determined by how the various cyber vulnerabilities impact
the grid’s various power applications to control the physical
system.
The cyber-attack on CPPS greatly differs from the tradi-
tional cyber-attack on IT systems. While attacker techniques
have closely resembled traditional attacks, their ability to
impact the grid is heavily dependent on the power system
applications or control functions supported by those sys-
tems. Fig. 18 shows how the cyber-attack would impact
the CPPS [180]. The first step of an attacker is to degrade
the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of some portion
of the cyber system supporting for CPPS. The degradation
impacts some of the power applications/control functions
used to support the grid. The attackers ability to manipulate
the control functions would then directly lead to the physical
system impact.
The power system is generally divided into three major
domains, namely, Generation, Transmission, and Distribu-
tion. Each domain has its control of specific machines/
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TABLE 7. A taxonomy of control loops in the power grid.
devices, protocols, and communication signals. Therefore,
each control system has its threats, vulnerabilities, and impact
on CPPS operations. Table 7 presents the classification of
control loops based on the domains in CPPS [180].
Fig. 19 shows the cybersecurity life-cycle model for
attack resilientWide-AreaMonitoring Protection andControl
(WAMPAC) applications in the power grid through a hub-
and-spokes model integrating attack deterrence, attack pre-
vention, attack detection, attack mitigation, attack resilience,
and attack forensics [56].
Attack Deterrence: The ability of the defender to pos-
itively influence the potential adversary not to carry out
attacks.
Attack Prevention: The ability of the defender to prevent
attacks on the system through risk assessment, risk mitiga-
tion, cybersecurity technologies, etc.
Attack Detection: The defender should detect the attack in
online/offline mode.
Attack Mitigation: The defender should apply the suitable
mitigation technique to maintain the operational status of the
system without any violation or degradation in the perfor-
mance, security, or stability of the grid.
Attack Resilience: If an attack occurs in the system, the sys-
temmust have adequate resiliency to maintain the operational
status of the system, perhaps at a degraded level of perfor-
mance, security, or stability.
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FIGURE 19. Cyber security life-cycle model.
Attack Forensics: Forensic analysis is useful to determine
the originator and source of the attack, which helps to deter-
mine future attacks.
Finally, each spoke of the hub-and-spoke model highlights
the innovative cyber-security approaches with efficient tech-
nologies and enabling scientific tools to prevent the succes-
sion of attacks along the cybersecurity life cycle.
Fig. 20 presents the research issues and potential solu-
tions for attaining attack resilience at the infrastructure layer
for WAMPAC [56]. Fig. 21 presents the research issues
and potential solutions for attaining attack resilience at the
application layer for WAMPAC [56]. For both the layers,
various issues are listed across the various domains, namely
online attack detection, mitigation, resilience, and offline risk
assessment & attack prevention. Table 8 lists out the taxon-
omy of cyber-attack and cybersecurity in CPPS. It should be
noted that a coordinated attack also possible where the multi-
ple attacks are combined to enhance the attacking behaviour
in CPPS further.
V. CPPS IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The CPPS is considered as a next-generation power grid that
allows the two-way flow of electricity and information to
create a wide distributed automated electrical power deliv-
ery network. The CPPS grid is also called a smart power
grid, future grid, intelligent grid, inter grid is an enhance-
ment of the 21st-century power grid of the world [248]. The
CPPS uses two-way flow, computational intelligence and
cyber-secure communication technologies in an integrated
manner across the generation, transmission, distribution, and
utilization of the electrical power capable of delivering the
power in more efficient ways and responds to the wide range
of events & conditions anywhere in the grid for the safe,
resilient, reliable, sustainable and efficient operation of the
power grid. The concept of CPPS started from the idea
of a smart grid with the abstraction of AMI that helps to
improve the energy efficiency, Demand Side Management
(DSM), developing self-healing grid, and resilient grid pro-
tection, etc. However, the new demand requirements urged
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FIGURE 20. Infrastructure layer attack resilience.
the power industries, government, and research organiza-
tions to rethink and expand the scope of the smart grid to
CPPS. The United States Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 directed to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to coordinate the research activities
to attain the objectives of smart grid systems and devices.
According to the report from NIST [249], the requirements
and benefits of the smart grid are the following:
• Enhancing power quality and reliability;
• Effective utilization of facility and preventing construc-
tion of back-up power plants;
• Improving the efficiency and capacity of existing elec-
tric power networks;
• Enhancing resilience and reliability to disturbances;
• Enabling predictive maintenance and self-healing
responses to system disruption;
• Facilitating the expanded deployment of renewable
power sources;
• Accommodating centralized and distributed power
sources;
• Automating operation and maintenance;
• Enabling EV and renewable power sources to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions;
• Avoiding the operation of the inefficient power plant
during peak usage periods to reduce oil consumption;
• Presenting opportunities for grid modernization;
• Enabling the transition to new energy storage options
and plug-in EVs;
• Increasing customer choice;
• Enabling new services, products, and markets.
With the above benefits of the smart grid, the NIST released
another report [250] on the CPS by joint work between the
smart grid working group and CPSs working group for the
energy domain. From this report the main characteristics of
CPS that support for the efficient operation of CPPS that
goes beyond conventional product, system, and application
are
• The combination of the physical and the cyber, and their
interconnectedness, is essential to CPS.
• A CPS maybe a System of Systems (SoS).
• Emergent behaviours are to be expected of CPS due to
the heterogeneous nature of CPS composition.
• CPS needs a methodology to ensure interdependency,
dealing with prominent effects, and managing evolution.
• CPS may be designed for multi-purpose applications.
• CPS is noted for enabling cross-domain applications.
• CPS potential impact on the physical system and their
interconnectedness with them raised the concern about
trustworthiness.
• CPS should be freely composable.
• CPS must be able to accommodate continuous and dis-
crete computational models.
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FIGURE 21. Application layer attack resilience.
• CPS must also support different modes of
communication.
• The heterogeneity and interdependency of CPS lead
them to exhibit a wide range of complexity.
• Cyber and Physical system time synchronization is a
sensitive component to CPS, and its centralized archi-
tecture is a major concern.
• CPS is characterized by the interaction between
the cyber and physical systems with their operating
environment.
To promote the smart grid/CPPS deployment activities, gov-
ernment, industry, academia, and research organizations had
spent a lot of money and efforts in pilot projects, smart grid
programs, and field studies. To help the readers about the
recent progress in CPPS, we summarized the major projects,
programs & trials related to the smart grid/CPPS is presented
in Table 5. It covers Smart Meter, AMI, Transmission Grid,
Micro Grid, DERs, EV, and Integrated Systems, etc. From
Table 9, it is inferred that most of the countries had spent a
significant investment for deployment of Smart Grid/CPPS
technologies and applications, but their integration is the new
challenge.
VI. OUTLOOK OF THE FUTURE CPPS
In general, the CPPS is a complex networked system that has
impacted the way electrical energy generated, transmitted,
and utilized. The electrical energy systems have evolved
through the years from the conventional power systems to
the smart grid and further explored CPSs in energy (CPSE)
with the consideration of primary energy and end-use energy
phases, as shown in Fig. 22 [265].
The future energy systems need a holistic approach
(systems-of-systems) formodelling, simulation, and analysis.
The various power grid blackouts occurred in worldwide are
due to the malfunctioning of the grid components (generator,
transmission lines, load buses, communication facilities, etc.)
and the increasingly stringent constraints on carbon emis-
sions regulations, market volatility. To prevent the system-
wide blackouts, it requires ICTs at a level higher than the
existing smart grid can offer. The CPPS has already advanced
than the smart grid environment and serves to be more
reliable for the holistic (systems of systems) approaches to
the smart grid problem, but it has not gone far enough.
The future energy systems should consider the coordina-
tion of various generalized environmental factors, social fac-
tors, economic factors, human behaviors, as well as hybrid
research framework with different time and scales. This
involves the varieties of large data with hidden relation-
ships in the complex economical, technological, social, and
environmental dimensions.
The economic and societal potential of CPPS can be
realized by a new concept of Cyber-Physical-Social Sys-
tems (CPSS). The CPSS lies at the intersection of the phys-
ical electric power systems, the cyber system market and
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FIGURE 22. Evolution of energy systems.
control layer, and social residential end-users, as shown in
Fig. 23 [266]. The CPSS encompasses the physical system,
ICTs infrastructure, human behavior, and changes the way
people interact with the complex interdependent systems. The
general concepts of CPSS are shown in Fig. 23, in which the
Social System plays a critical part in such an interdependent
system. Social Systems include customer behaviors, policy,
regulation, and economics. The new concept of CPSS in the
energy sector comprises primary energy, secondary energy,
and end-user energy in a broader framework but not limited
to, other essential factors to be considered such as inter-
mittent DERs, influence of market operations, transition in
primary energy sources and end-user behaviors [265]. The
enabling technologies for CPPS development are the Internet
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of Things, Big data, Cloud Computing, Network Systems,
etc. For the CPSSE, the additional enabling technologies
includes economics, social science, environmental science,
cognitive science, psychology, and political science. This
enhances the CPSS in the energy system, and it can be seen as
a part of the journey from the power system to the smart grid,
CPSE to CPSSE, as shown in Fig. 21. The driving force in
CPSSE is induced by the interaction between them, which is
much more powerful than the individual and internal driving
forces of energy systems, information systems, and human
societies. All these factors are critical for the successful
implementation of CPSS in energy future.
VII. CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
• The impact of the communication network effects such
as latency, outliers, missing data, etc on performance,
reliability, and security of the CPPS may be considered.
This area of research is emerging and likely to see more
contributions in the near future.
• The traditional CPPS communication networks have
been designed to cover separate parts rather than the
whole power grid. Therefore an interconnected com-
munication network for generation, transmission, and
distribution to be designed and its network topology
should be optimized considering 5G technology.
• The traditional deterministic type N-1 contingency anal-
ysis was not suitable for CPPSs. Therefore stochastic
cyber-physical contingency analysis should be devel-
oped and analysed for the CPPS. More research is
needed in this area.
• In cybersecurity for CPPS, fast authentication is an open
problem and there is a wide scope for this research work.
• Developing the testbed for CPPS to analyse the effects
of cyber events such as communication failures and
cyber-attacks due to single or coordinated failures on
the physical power system for the specific application
is another emerging research area. The testbed 5G tech-
nology can be demonstrated for future CPPSs and also
we can include other types of energy systems such as
heat, gas, etc.
• Estimating the cost of cyber attacks on CPPS at the
national level for critical infrastructure protection is an
important research area in the economic analysis of
power systems.
• An advanced data-driven method with machine learning
applications for CPPS in power system control area is
emerging. It includes the hybrid data fusion of cyber and
physical systems to monitor the stability of CPPS.
• Analysing the impact of the integration of renewable
energy systems and electric vehicles in CPPS. Based on
this a cyber-physical security analytics should be devel-
oped for the holistic cyber-physical transactive energy
systems.
• Cyber resilience is the ability of CPPS to prepare,
respond, and recover when cyber attacks happen.
In addition to power system resilience the cyber sys-
tem resilience also should be considered for developing
control and operation methods and planning strategies
to improve power grid resilience against physical and
cyber events. A cyber-physical resilience metrics, eval-
uation methods, development of universally accepted
standard definitions are needed for CPPS and there is
a wide-scope for this research topic.
VIII. CONCLUSION
CPPS is a new technology that integrates cyber systems and
physical power systems to achieve high efficiency and perfor-
mance. In recent years, research studies on CPPS modelling,
simulation, and analysis have gained considerable attention.
A grand challenge in CPPS research is the development of
models that elegantly interface the continuous-time charac-
teristics of the physical system with the discrete-time charac-
teristics of the cyber system. A review onmodelling methods,
simulation tools, cyber-attack types, cyber-attack detection
and mitigation countermeasures in CPPS are summarized in
this paper.
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FIGURE 23. Cyber-physical-social system.
The major contributions to the review of CPPS are high-
lighted as follows:
• This study mainly summarizes the CPPS modelling
methods considering the impacts of cyber-attacks on
power system control, power system stability, types of
cyber-attacks, from the viewpoints of topology, mech-
anism, probability, and simulation. The unified frame-
work for modelling of physical and cyber components
in the CPPS is presented in Section II.
• The softwares corresponding to the CPPS for modelling
and simulation of a physical system and cyber sys-
tem and co-simulation tools are discussed elaborately.
Different types of software for modelling and simu-
lation of complex CPPS are presented in Section III.
The co-simulation software includes and combines
knowledge in multiple domains to consider the CPPS
holistically.
• Cyber-physical security is the core of modern CPPS.
In Section IV, we have presented a systematic and
comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art in the
field, ranging from cyber-attack types, defense strate-
gies, to a wide range of challenges and opportunities.
As CPPS has become one of the economic and tech-
nological developments around the globe, this survey
provides critical insights into enhancing cybersecurity
for CPPS bymaintaining the integrity of the CPPS under
complex cyber-attacks. To this end, we have reviewed
the cyber-security issues in CPPS, which included
attack detection, mitigation techniques, risk analy-
sis threat modelling, and vulnerability assessment for
cyber systems.
• We have surveyed the recent ongoing and completed
research projects on CPPS in world-wide countries and
briefly discussed in the Section V.
• The outlook of future CPPS focuses on CPSS with
the integrated modelling framework utilizing a unified
computing framework that is discussed elaborately in
Section VI.
• Finally we have presented the current issues and
research directions for the researchers those who are
working in the CPPS research areas in Section VII.
The modelling methods, simulation softwares, cyber-attacks,
and cybersecurity measures discussed in this paper imparts
strong support for the secure and safe operation of the CPPS.
An intensive analysis of simultaneous attacks on multiple tar-
gets is discussed elaborately. All the three modelling methods
of CPPS considered both the power flow and information
flow. In summary, there is no doubt that the emergence of
CPPS leads to more efficient power system operations in
the future, provides better services, and eventually revolu-
tionize our daily lives. From the survey result, it was seen
that this CPPS research area is growing exponentially in
terms of publications, especially in recent years; this con-
firms that the researchers are more interested in exploring
results, theories, and technologies. We hope this survey wel-
comes the other researchers to enter this emerging area.
The future of CPPS addressed CPSSs associating CPSs with
the social world, which is an important research topic that
contributes to the construction of the future smart power
system. It should be noted that only crucial research works
are reviewed and summarized in this paper. However, there
are some shortcomings in these modeling, simulation, and
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analysis. For instance, the specific topology of the commu-
nication network and transmission mechanism types in the
information and communication network are not considered.
By neglecting the steady-state and transient characteristics
of CPPS subsystems the current research has only a theoret-
ical significance. The modeling methods, simulation tools,
cybersecurity applications, and performance evaluation are
simulation-based approaches. To understand the complex
behavior of CPPS, it is very difficult to model all the sub-
systems in simulation platforms. Therefore the construction
of the CPPS testbed will further help the researchers, aca-
demicians, and industrialists to explore the in-depth knowl-
edge of CPPS. Therefore, developing a testbed for CPPS
that takes the actual power flow and information flow into
consideration is the main problem to be solved in the near
future. Based on this CPPS testbed, it is more appropriate
to analyze and evaluate the three different types of modeling
methods of CPPSs. In addition to that, cyber-attacks, cyber-
security algorithms, digital forensic analysis, risk assess-
ment, attack modeling and defense can be demonstrated by
organizing a co-simulation setup for CPPS and it becomes
relatively crucial. Also, the major challenge is the design
of large-scale CPPS and its implementation in real-world
applications like the Wide-Area Monitoring and Control
System (WAMCS).
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